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This paper tries to show that the naturalistic view of addiction is mired in 
contradictions that stem from reducing the addict to a weak-willed subject 
who loses control over his or her body. From a phenomenological perspective, 
addiction reveals itself to be a habit which eventually becomes harmful, but 
has its primary sources in the embodied needs of a worldly subject. The aim of 
this paper is to uncover the dimensions of the lived addiction that are 
neglected in the contemporary naturalistic discourse: the lived-body (Leib) 
and the worldly context of the addict. Firstly, we try to do justice to the 
variety of addictions by underlying that their new and surprising forms are 
determined by the intersubjective tissue wherein the subject operates. 
Secondly, the loss of control in addiction, how the subject deals with the 
tendency to satisfy a need, is experienced as powerlessness, as expressed in 
the accounts of ecstasy addicts regarding altered states of mind. The last 
section of this paper will argue that this sense of powerlessness cannot be 
equated with a weakness of the will because a strong, forceful will engenders 
the same vertigo of being prey to strange powers. The embodied aspect of 
addiction and the spontaneous, bodily need it saturates will clarify further 
this claim. 
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In a recent post, well-known film director Lena Dunham 
spoke about her “apology addiction”: 
I had men more than twice my age for whom I was the final word on 
the set of “Girls,” and I had to express my needs and desires clearly 
to a slew of lawyers, agents and writers. And while my commitment 
to my work overrode almost any performance anxiety I had, it didn't 
override my hardwired instinct to apologize. If I changed my mind, if 
someone disagreed with me, even if someone else misheard me or 
made a mistake... I was so, so sorry. „If you say sorry again, I'm going 
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to lovingly murder you,‟ Jenni texted during a meeting. „I'm sorry,‟ I 
texted back. (Dunham 2016) 
One may contend that such an addiction does not really 
exist. Nevertheless, this extensive use of the term is not 
entirely unjustified. The notion of “addiction” has been coined 
by the psychoanalyst Joyce McDougall in 1978 in order to “fill 
in a semantic void” (Leroy 2015) created by the sudden burst of 
“behavior addictions” (sex, eating, gambling, etc.). It seems  
however that the semantic void has not yet been filled, since 
almost every year we hear of a “new” addiction and this surge 
enjoys a constant thematic attention from numerous professionals 
in the field of addiction studies (see, among others, Trouessin 
2015 or Karim & Chaudhri 2012). In fact, the heavy, and 
sometimes, outright creative use of the term1 is symptomatic of 
a cultural change and might provide valuable clues about the 
underlying essential core of the phenomenon of addiction.  
The successful career of the concept of “addiction”, cheered 
on in today‟s discourse available both in everyday life and in the 
scientific and philosophic communities, represents in our 
view an indication of the fact that it might actually describe a 
slightly different phenomenon than its conceptual predecessors 
and/or competitors (dependence, substance abuse, altered states 
of consciousness or the obsolete French term of toxicomanie). 
Compared with the older ones, which have been restricted to 
the field of the medical science, “addiction” has the advantage of 
pointing to aspects which are far beyond the medical sphere. 
That is the reason why it is susceptible to be part of a process of 
overmedicalisation2. However, its capacity to encompass a large 
variety of aspects might help us as uncover the fundamental 
phenomenon which generated the behaviours that need to be 
described, understood and eventually tackled.  
We find some hints in the above mentioned post of 
Lena Dunham. Addiction is somehow related to others, to work 
environment, to anxiety, to changing minds and affects. Except 
for the reference to “hardwired instincts”, which is in fact a 
mechanical one, there is little talk about the body. It seems that, 
since no substance is involved and the behaviour in question is 
a purely verbal one, a discussion about the role of bodily 
operations or substrata would be out of the question. It is 




astonishing that Lena Dunham, who in her films explored 
deeply the question of gendered body in contemporary society 
(Weitz 2015; Marghitu & Ng 2013; Woods 2015; Householder 
2015), fails in this case to recognize the fundamental dimension 
of corporeality or embodiment3. The reason might be the fact 
that she endorses, as the vast majority of our contemporaries, a 
dualist vision of the human person, in which the self – an 
abstract, disembodied self – is supposed to exert a form of 
control over the body – a machine-like body.  
Leaving aside the dualist Cartesian presuppositions of 
Lena Dunham‟s reflections, the extension of the use of the term 
“addiction” that she proposes brings nevertheless to the 
light some neglected or taken for granted aspects of this 
phenomenon. We noticed that the behaviour that bothers her 
occurs only in certain situations or, more precisely, do not occur 
when she is focused on her work (which, most probably, will 
make her a workaholic). We cannot speak in this case of “lack of 
control” and even less of “weakness of will”. It seems that she 
acts differently in different situations, which is considered a 
sign of good mental health and a precondition of success. That 
shows that our behaviours are highly context-dependent. If this 
is true, addictive conducts are answers to a particular (physical, 
cultural, social, and normative) context and that they cannot be 
assigned solely to the individual‟s self or mind.  
Irrespective of the paths one would take in exploring the 
meaning of addiction, there is an almost palpable sense of 
powerlessness, of which many accounts on addiction, either 
personal or public, draw an anguished picture. Even scientific 
(naturalist) accounts cannot avoid to make reference to it. 
(Flanagan 2013, 66-67) 
While the signs or the outcomes of powerlessness let 
themselves be described by a naturalistic approach of addiction, 
the source of powerlessness and the capacity to recover need a 
more comprehensive framework in order to be identified. This 
paper explores addiction as embodied powerlessness, i. e. as a 
way that the bodily subjects strive to accommodate to forms of 
injunctions that they perceive as being external, when in fact 
their overpowering grip is internally elaborated and motivated. 
Should we frame the experience of addiction as “loss of control”? 
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Is addiction a weakness of the will? This paper will advocate for 
a phenomenological approach, in which the aspects related to 
“control” and, implicitly, willing are dealt with in a manner that 
allows their articulation to the world to be revealed. 
 
1. Loss of control in addiction?  
 
“One wants to know what it is like to be alcoholic – 
if, that is, there is any commonality to the experiences of 
alcoholics [...]”. (Flanagan 2013, 66) The same can be said about 
any other addiction. But what exactly do we want to know and 
to what purpose? Owen Flanagan – a well-known naturalistic 
philosopher and a participant in AA meetings – summarizes the 
expectations concerning the accounts on addiction:  
One wants to know about such things as whether and if so what kind 
of loss of control alcoholics experience in relation to alcohol (as well 
as any and all affective and cognitive deficits). One wants to know 
what the brain is doing and how it contributes to the production of 
the characteristic phenomenologies and control (and other cognitive 
and affective) problems. One wants to know what effect heavy 
drinking has on vulnerable organ systems (e.g., the brain, the heart, 
and the liver). And, of course, all along the way, one should want 
to know how the sociomoral-cultural-political ecology normalizes, 
romanticizes, pathologizes (and so forth) alcoholism and its relations, 
heavy drinking, recklessness under the influence, and so on. (Flanagan 
2013, 66) 
But is it that what we really intend to know when we 
read the account of the struggle to recover from addiction and 
to cope with life? While is it true that we are highly curious to 
know when and how one lost control over her life, we are even 
more interested to know and learn how the person regained 
control. What emerges in the first place from addiction narratives 
is a sense of powerlessness. There are plenty of such stories, but 
we are not always ready to see beyond the factual data or the 
underlying moral judgements. When the account is placed in an 
intersubjective framework, the empathy will lead us to discover 
that what we have in front of us is a vulnerable subject. (Bernet 
2000; Staudigl 2007; Throop 2012)  
While many addicts are describing their experience of 
addiction in terms of “loss of control” or “weakness of will”, it 
does not mean that they grasp accurately its content and 




dynamic. It might happen, for example, that the terms of the 
discourse are borrowed from other exemplary reports or that 
the addict tries to present his situation in terms that are 
familiar to the interlocutor and/or generally accepted by the 
society. 
For example, not everyone is interested in what the 
brain is doing and some are heavily trying not to think to the 
damages that a particular substance might do to certain organs 
of their body. And besides, not every addiction involves 
substance abuse. We might object, therefore, to the naturalist view, 
such as that expressed by Flanagan, that the “characteristic 
phenomenologies” of addiction are highly variable, depending 
on person, culture etc., and, in fact, they might prove to be 
less than “characteristic”. Not everyone in the contemporary 
societies, including the Western ones, shares a naturalistic view 
of the body and it is not certain that such a view will contribute 
to the solving of the addiction problem. In fact, we can see 
from Flanagan‟s own discourse on Alcoholics Anonymous  
epistemological framework (Flanagan 2013, 68-69) that the 
success of the AA is not related to the objectivity of their 
account of addiction. He actually stated that AA functions as 
what Foucault called an episteme, placing its members under 
pressure to re-describe their experience of addiction to fit the 
AA mould (see also Levy 2013, 7-8). What AA actually does 
cannot be understood solely at the level of individual experience 
and inter-individual exchange of ideas. It re-places the 
addicted persons in another (physical, social-cultural-normative) 
environment, which means that addiction is a social, not an 
individual problem.  
The naturalistic accounts of addiction fail by disconnecting 
the individual‟s experience from the experience of the others. 
Owen Flanagan, for example, argues openly that the second 
perspective – that of the addicted individual narrating her 
experience – should not be regarded as privileged. He dismisses 
the accounts provided from this perspective as being modified 
by the views imposed by the AA and, then, as misdescribing 
addiction (alcoholism, in this case). The epistemological certitude 
comes with a cost, which is the loss of exactly what should be 
the outcome of the inquiry: how to change a painful experience, 
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how to describe the change of particular problematic behaviours, 
and finally how to point to, preserve and strengthen the 
“operative centre”, supposing that we acknowledge that there 
is one.  
Addiction entails difficulty in exercising self-control. It is 
possible, therefore, that all accounts of addiction might be false 
or, at least, not entirely accurate. The question of accurate 
descriptions of addiction might be itself misplaced; what counts 
in these cases is what it works, what helps the addicted 
individual to get more control over her life. The practitioners in 
this field ask themselves, naturally, why does it work. As 
Flanagan suggested in the case of AA, that is probably a 
repository of practical wisdom about self-control and recovery. 
It might belong to it also the rhetoric of “loss of control”, which 
encourages the addict to see her abstention as a sign of 
regaining control. (Levy 2013, 8)  
If addiction is not necessarily “loss of control”, how could 
we describe it better? What we are advocating in this is a 
phenomenological approach, in which the aspects related to 
“control” and, implicitly, willing are dealt with in a manner that 
allows their articulation to the whole embodied and worldly 
situation of the subject to be taken into account.  
In the footsteps of Erwin Strasser (1969), Sean Leneghan 
adapted the phenomenological (Husserlian) perspective and its 
methodological framework to an ethnographical study of ecstasy 
(Leneghan 2011). It is in the dialog between the researcher and 
the participant (recte, the addicted person) that „the unique 
Welt-Stimmung (world-mood) and the overall dynamic trajectory 
[...] of ecstasy experience” were to be configured (Leneghan 
2011, 39). Going back through layers of human interactions, this 
phenomenologically informed anthropological inquiry brings to 
the light the processual morphology of the varieties of ecstasy 
experience (as mode of being-in-the-world). It investigates the 
specific aspects of lived ecstasy. It begins with the activities 
that take place in the primary sites of consumption and goes 
further towards the cognitive and body expressions of users‟ 
experiences and their attempts to keep a control of their 
(altered) mind states. In a first level codification of the primary 
ethnographic reports, there are frequently employed terms like: 




“modifications”, “intensifications”, and “modulations”. They are 
pointing to a fluid typology of the subjective experience of the 
user, interpreted with the “devices” – types and concepts – 
forged for describing the ordinary states of consciousness. The 
peculiar states of mind which are following initial phases of 
consumption, as well as the modified intersubjective field 
resulting from ecstasy use and the phase of “scatting” (the post-
plateau phase), are extensively documented on the basis of 
users‟ accounts and researchers‟ participative observations.  
The experiencing and the corresponding description 
of what is lived in the “altered” states of mind are helping 
the researcher to gain access to the subjective world(s) of 
ecstasy users. It is the starting point for communication and 
understanding between the user and the possible listener or the 
observer, who is experiencing the same objects in the mode 
of as-if. The reporting user and the listener are building a 
common experience around the noematic kernel of their specific 
modes of experiencing. A shared experience, a sense of being 
together is possible even in the case of the strangest ways of 
feeling.  
If we take into account also the pragmatic effects of 
experiencing, the most bizarre experiences are not pushing 
people away from one another, as they may appear in a 
naturalized perspective. On the contrary, they bring people 
together. Not only those directly involved, but also these ones 
and the others, who didn‟t undergo this particular experience. 
For they are answering to the intentions of the others as the 
special ones, as the ones who did this or that, or needed this or 
that. 
Although the purpose of this experience is a kind of 
hetero-transformation of the psycho-physical unity of the 
individual, the problem that she or he encounters is that of the 
dissolution of the world engendered in such states (Leneghan 
2011, 42), a form of unavoidable internal degradability of that 
experience. Socially, it takes the form of “addiction”, which is 
defined here as “repeated consumption” (Leneghan 2011, 43), 
and of the strategies for moderating use. A genuine sense of the 
power of the self appears through the reports on “tolerances, 
addiction, reconstitution and fading away”. (Leneghan 2011, 
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193). A “subject” timidly reaffirms itself when the magic vanishes. 
Some are seeing a transcendent goal, like “being able to dance 
generally” (Leneghan 2011, 183) or are invoking a “Golden 
Mean”: “anything in moderation”. (Leneghan 2011, 183) 
 
2. Weakness of the will and possibilities of action 
It is often heard that addiction designates a weak-willed 
person. This direct and simple claim is oblivious to its own 
ambiguity: is it the addiction that produces the akratic subject? 
Or, on the contrary, the lessening of the will gives way to 
addiction? If forced to reflexivity, those who uphold this claim 
reduce its ambiguous meaning to an equally rushed (moral) 
diagnostic: the addict does not have the will to stop feeding his 
addiction, he lacks the will to say no. If he tries to end it, and 
therefore has the will to stop, it is a weak will that tumbles 
back into addiction. If the addict has the will to say no, he lacks 
the will to enact it. The proponents of this claim with regard to 
addiction seem to cling to a simple equation of getting in and 
out of self-harmful behaviours: the willing addict should be an 
equally willing de-addict; where the will creates the addiction, 
the will can make it go away. The will at work in the habit of 
addiction is the same and continuous with the will of getting-
out-of-addiction. The unity of the will should be proof of its 
undiluted strength. The force of the will is a given and, 
according to this naïve view, the addict prefers to devise the 
ruse of its weakness as an alibi for its continual indulgence.  
The problem with this claim that identifies a weak 
willed subject, engulfed by addiction, who can simply sort 
himself out by mobilising a stronger will, is that it completely 
eludes the defining role of the body, habit and need and their 
relationship with the will. At the same time, there should be a 
distinction between will and the subject‟s bundle of powers, of 
what he can do – Husserl calls it the sphere of “Ich kann” (1989, 
270) – of his capabilities or abilities. The will does not operate 
in a vacuum: even from a phenomenological perspective, it is 
not enough to describe the essence of the will as the execution 
by a decision-making subject of a project guided by an intended 
aim because it expresses a form of intentionality adequate for a 
disembodied consciousness and equally detached from the chain 




of meaningful historicity. Paul Ricoeur (1949) proposes, therefore, 
the enlargement of the Husserlian cogito whereby the practical 
intentionality of the will gains its whole gamut of eidetic 
relationships with the consciousness, the body and the world. 
So much so, that the willing subject is a practical subject whose 
activity is founded by a synthesis of voluntary and involuntary 
acts4; the spontaneity of consciousness has a complicated bond 
with the bodily spontaneity. The relationship between the will 
and the involuntary is not, a priori, an oppositional one; it 
is a dynamic and reciprocal rapport wherein the involuntary 
prepares, triggers and sustains the activity of the will which, in 
turn, brings about the overall meaning of the practical act. But, 
at the same time, the input of involuntary activity (preformed 
skills or instinctive bodily conducts, emotion, passion, habit) 
might contribute, through all kinds of “organically”-lived 
disturbances, to the loss of the willing intentions in the density 
of the body and which, in that case, lead to form a stumbling 
block, a resistance to the exercise of the will in its immediate 
spontaneity. The involuntary acts, thus, impose a temporary or 
fatal limit to the willing subject. It must be clearly stated, 
though, that practical limitations come not only from the 
involuntary, bodily side of the subject ‟s activity, but also 
from its being precisely a human being who ages and whose 
capabilities become fixed and ossified or corroded by time.  
A first confusion that arises from the discourse concerning 
the weak-willed addict has to do with what “weak” means; it 
seems to indicate an objectivistic and naturalistic view of 
willing: if only the addict would apply more force to his will! It 
is similar with the perspective that the natural sciences 
endorse with regard to the hungry and disturbed body: eat less 
(obese), eat more (anorexic). These quantitative understandings 
of the relationship between willing and body do not succeed in 
grasping the subjective meaning of the lived addiction or the 
lived anorexia nervosa. And this naturalistic approach leads to 
a paradox that I shall deal with below.  
The involuntary activity of the lived body, which is 
different from the objective body, is an important source of 
embodied capabilities for the subject. By doing and acting, the 
subject accumulates and develops forms of power or potency 
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(“being able to”) that appear to him/herself only in reflection. 
They are, at the same time, sedimentations of prior actions and 
possibilities of future actions. Certain capabilities seem to be 
innate: Ricoeur (1966) talks about preformed skills that translate 
instinctive powers of bodily movements and achievements. Not 
everybody possesses the ability to play the piano or to become a 
great boxer. Not everybody becomes addicted (to dance, to box, 
to alcohol, drugs, etc.). The foundation of acquiring these highly 
developed habits is provided by pre-reflexive, instinctual forms 
of bodily behaviour. They offer to the will a grip on the lived 
body, without being thematically grasped by consciousness. And 
the lived habits are usually so versatile and supple that the 
effort of bodily willing falls out of the sphere of subjective 
awareness: a pre-reflective, bodily spontaneity fulfils a triggering 
impulse to which the will only needs to give its agreement. 
Willing is easy exactly because it is sustained by the power of 
the subject inscribed in his acquired bodily habit. Why is it that 
this will, that accomplishes a project almost without effort, is 
not called weak instead of easy, seeing that the subject does not 
need to exert a strong will to engage in habitual conduct? If 
that were the case, the subject whose will follows the tendency 
and force of the habit should be weak-willing: the winning 
boxer or fighter who uses the “melody cells” (Ricoeur 1966, 284) 
and rhythms of his instinctive and acquired skills and habits 
should have, according to this view, the weakest will. The 
correct explanation is that the corporeal capability of the 
subject, shaped and amplified by the repetition of habit, along 
with practical possibilities successfully tested and sedimented, 
offers to the will an easy, pre-formed way of execution which is 
extremely efficacious. Easy means here efficacy: the effort of the 
body and the reflexive will do not have to intervene in order for 
the project to be carried through5. There is already a pre-given 
course of action in the form of the acting possibilities of the 
embodied subject. The driven dancer dances easily; the trained 
boxer boxes easily. The addict keeps being addicted easily. The 
lived body is docile and easy to master and delivers efficaciously 
the satisfaction of the completed action. When the subject 
possesses the power of doing and the necessary know-how, 




everything is easy: the will becomes almost effortless and easy, 
the body docile.  
It seems counter-intuitive to describe addiction under 
the guise of power. It is a practical power, a form of doing 
acquired through habit and sedimented as a latent possibility 
available to a willing subject. Viewed from the point of view of 
habit, addiction is a practical, subjective ability. And the 
converse seems true: in every skill acquired, there is a kind of 
obsession or addiction at work. But it is wrong to reduce 
addiction to habit. Even to bad habits. A first way out of this 
restricted perspective is furnished by the common parlance of 
“the force of habit” – again, a naturalistic vocabulary. And why 
speak of the force of habit when it is so easy to execute the 
habit itself? According to Husserl, for example, whose notions of 
habit and habituality (Habitualität) are more extended than 
Ricoeur‟s, habit exhibits a compulsion of, or a tendency to, 
repetition, irrespective of the fact that the habit is governed by 
instinctive drives, or by value-motives6. On the contrary, for 
Ricoeur, the habit does not possess in itself this kind of driving 
force:  
The need of a habitual action is actually secondary to the habit; it is 
an aspect which is sometimes present, at other times absent. These 
contradictory effects cannot be explained by habit but by its 
ingression into the deeper organic life of needs and sources of 
interest. I do not feel deprived of typing, of doing acrobatics, or of 
solving equations for the sole reason that I have mastered these 
activities and that I don't have an occasion to exercise them. They are 
inert tools which have no source of interest within themselves, 
though the need of earning a livelihood, a wish to surprise my 
acquaintances, etc., can suddenly animate these habits and attribute 
to them a demand of which they are devoid in themselves. (Ricoeur 
1966, 114) 
The tendency to repetition does not belong to habit itself 
because otherwise it can‟t be explained why a habit that once 
produced pleasure and satisfaction by its execution, now it  
engenders disgust and revulsion: for example, a professional 
habit such as correcting papers might become tedious. Or 
eating eggs for breakfast one more time turns out to be a 
disagreeable prospect. Therefore, habits in themselves are 
neutral because they provide the easiest way for the powers of 
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the subject to exercise themselves. But the subjective abilities 
and potentialities do not trigger the habit; they only prepare 
its actualization. To use Husserlian terms, the powers of the 
subject are like a parenthesized or neutralised habit (and 
preformed skills), practical possibilities kept in suspension until 
the triggering impulse engages them in actual action. The force 
of the habit, its tendency to set off the chain of action is sparked 
off ultimately by need. The intentionality of need presupposes a 
lived or experienced lack and an impulse oriented towards 
something not given in presence. This needy intentionality is 
thus an active affect, a pre-action, an urge that strives to satisfy 
an indigence felt organically, before any representation and will 
come into the scene. The basic level of need is constituted by the 
corporeally inscribed drives or tendencies towards vaguely 
determined vital “objects”: hunger tends toward food, thirst  
toward liquids, etc. If the will could, in principle, master the 
tendency of need, it cannot however control its impetus: I can 
refrain from eating, but I cannot help feeling hunger. Another 
important difference between Husserl and Ricoeur should be 
noted quickly: whereas Husserl makes habit collapse into the 
drive category in order to diminish the dualism of nature and 
spirit, or nature and freedom, in the make-up of the subject 
(both instinctual behaviour and value-motives gain the force of 
a drive when taken up by the habit), Ricoeur keeps habit and 
drive separated and adopts the tactic of undermining this 
dualistic view of the subject by showing that the first rank of 
value-motives are actually fostered by need itself: before any 
act of positing by the willing subject, there are values that 
emerge and attract the will in virtue of the bodily flesh, of the 
subject being embodied. This primary spontaneity of the lived 
body generates vital values toward which the will turns as 
receptivity: bread is good, water is good. When the need enters 
the form of habit, the easiness of execution, that we talked 
about earlier, becomes a value-motive, a good for the bodily 
subject. The vague intentionality of need, that searches for 
intentional objects to satisfy and saturate it, is revealed to the 
subject through habitual behaviour, through regular ways of 
action. And need usually takes the path of the easiest practical 
option: habit offers an easy outlet for latent needs. Efficacy, the 




least expenditure of effort, seem to define the relationship 
between need and the available repetitive action of habit.  
Whence comes the appearance of the force of the habit 
though? Why is it that the habit seems to create new needs? 
Ricoeur states that: “In extending need by an easy conduct, in 
showing to it that it can and how it can satisfy itself, the 
schema of available action in some way infects the need itself.” 
(Ricoeur 1966, 114). And also: “Si donc l'habitude affecte le 
besoin au point de sembler l'inventer, c'est par choc en retour de 
la forme usuelle acquise sur des besoins latents”7 (Ricoeur 1966, 
109). If the need triggers the habit, the latter offers to the need 
the available, customary paths for its saturation. The shock 
produced when a habit extends a need does not have the 
meaning of pressure or constraint, like when two opposing 
forces meet. On the contrary, the shock is the result of  the 
easiness with which the need is satisfied by habit. And because 
of this easiness of execution, the habit infects the need itself to 
have recourse to the same pre-given form of action every time 
the urge is pressing. That‟s why Ricoeur speaks of habit as a 
“quasi-need” (Ricoeur 1966, 114): habits are inert tools until the 
need gives them the impetus of actualizing a subjective power; 
but, in the aftermath of habit and need working together, the 
habit takes the appearance of a “quasi-need”, obfuscating its 
real source. Habit is ultimately a means to satisfy needs. Its 
force consists in giving to the need easy access to pre-
established ways of action and to pre-formed powers of the 
subject.  
What about addiction which, sometimes, deals with 
“fabricated” needs? There are forms of addiction that enhance, 
at overwhelming levels, the vital needs: food addiction, sex 
addiction, etc. and they can be easily integrated within 
Ricoeur‟s theory of need and habit. Nevertheless, one of the 
most spread conception about addiction is that it creates new 
needs for the subject: drugs, alcohol, gambling, etc. Does not the 
habit create these needs after all? Ricoeur claimsthat:  
It is never true that habit creates a need – even the most artificial 
needs, such as needs of tranquilizers and stimulants, always refer to 
the genuine tissue of need in which exercise had worked a kind of 
derivative bloodletting. Usage never does more than reveal the 
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primitive sources of motivation which then function along lines of 
least resistance. (Ricoeur 1966, 115)  
The point that Ricoeur makes here is that artificial 
needs are not external or imposed needs, created by the object 
of habit, but, that they are in fact, the needs of the embodied 
subject who uses the habit in order to find alleviation. The 
object of the habit is coveted by the subject because it appears 
to him/her with the appealing traits that the need bestows upon 
it. Someone who‟s not into ballet, does not get the appeal of 
ballet shoes or ballet music. Someone who is not into drugs, 
stays immune to their pleasurable allure. The artificial need is 
not created by habit, but it corresponds or expresses a bona fide 
need that profits, in a motivated way, of the easy route toward 
satisfaction provided by the available habit. Having to deal 
with artificial needs means that there is an unsatisfied genuine 
need that strives for saturation.  
One more thing should be said at this point. What will 
can do, when confronted by need, is not to take a directly 
oppositional stand against it. The common sense which claims 
that addiction entails a weak-willed subject seems to imply that 
if the addict could oppose more strongly his/her addiction, 
things would improve. Or, Ricoeur stresses relentlessly that the 
involuntary and the will are not opposing categories: even when 
the necessities of the unconscious, character and life come into 
play as fatally limiting the practical powers of the subject, there 
should be a consenting will that experiences them not as 
limiting, but as a source of (limited) freedom. This oppositional 
and domineering stance demanded from the will in order to 
parade its force and strength proves to be ruinous when seen 
from the perspective of addiction, too. Binswanger, for example, 
in his study of Ellen West (Binswanger, 1958), a patient who 
suffered from food addiction and opposed it with a mighty will 
and who ended up in suicide, reveals that West‟s behaviour 
since she was a baby was characterised by “wilfulness”, by a 
will to oppose her own organic tendencies (to gain weight while 
simply growing up), her family and her social world whose 
values did not appeal to her8. This excess of the will, directed 
straightforwardly and confrontationally towards herself, the 
others and the world corresponds to the pure self-positing 




power of the consciousness seen as the only generator of values 
and motives for action and satisfaction. Wilfulness means, 
ultimately, a strong claim by the conscious self to be the sole 
breeder of values and the sole container of impetus for action, 
opposing thus strongly the needs of the body and the ways of 
action supported by the pre-given world. All West‟s incursions 
in the sphere of playful activity (riding, hiking) and that of 
working and action (university, social work) were short-lived 
because they did not offer satisfaction to what were her genuine 
needs. She could form technical and professional habits, but 
they did ultimately disappoint her. In the long analysis of her 
illness, Binswanger unveils step by step how need comes to 
take over her life completely: the intentionality of need is 
characterised by a powerful drive to eat (the tendency) and by 
an “animalic hunger” (the lack) (Binswanger 1958, 291). Ellen 
West expresses in her diary the same idea as Ricoeur: “I can 
summon up such a will power that I actually eat nothing. But I 
cannot suppress the desire for it.” (Binswanger 1958: 254). Her 
ideal of slimness equalled with the ideal of being bodiless. Her 
confrontational and wilful attitude expressed itself within the 
spasmodic relationship with her addiction: periods of almost 
complete refusal to eat, followed by overwhelming outbursts of 
animalic hunger and total capitulation. Her will strongly 
opposes the tendency to eat so much so that she does not eat 
almost at all. She cuts off her body completely by exercising 
her imperious will. But the bodily need cannot be totally 
suppressed by a head-on, wilful opposition that ultimately does 
not satisfy the body and does not clarify and explain the need.  
The analysis of Ellen West conducted by Binswanger 
(1958) shows what are the perils of complying with a highly 
polemic and combative will, which in everyday vocabulary 
might be admiringly described as strong will. Addiction, 
because it‟s a problem of need and not of will, should be 
addressed not in a spirit of antagonism between the involuntary 
and the voluntary, but in the more integral and synthetic view 
of the embodied subject. The most important task for the will is 
to understand the source of the habit of addiction which is need. 
The will is not a kind of blind strength that can bar a habit 
from occurring and a need from being satisfied just because it 
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wills it so. The will is a reflexive will, it is an intentional 
activity of the embodied consciousness and, therefore, a source 
of meaning for the habit and action in general. The willing 
subject should approach addiction with a willingness to 
comprehend the need that feeds the addiction. The difficulty 
comes from the fact that need is ultimately the basic layer of 
embodied affectivity and is steeped in obscurity. But at the 
same time, will cannot become excessively reflexive in the sense 
of pure intellectual rumination. Again Ellen West talked about 
the vertigo she felt when doing solely the work of the mind 
(“The only work I do is mental” – Binswanger 1958, 255), again 
breaking off any relation with the frightening body: “It drives 
me to despair that with all my big words I cannot get myself 
further. I am fighting against uncanny powers which are 
stronger than I. I cannot seize and grasp them” (Binswanger 
1958, 259). And Ricoeur talks of an analogon of this over-
reflexive will that the non-addict encounters in hesitation: 
“in the chaos of my intentions lurks the conviction of my 
powerlessness. I experience not my possibility, but my im-
possibility: “I am not up to it”, “I am out of my depth”, “I am 
lost, swamped” – “I feel powerless” (Ricoeur 1966, 138). 
Consequently, to develop an oppositional, strong will is 
not the way to go in finding a durable remedy against addiction. 
The reflexive will should, on the contrary, be receptive to the 
troubles and disturbances of meaning and organic functionality 
expressed by the need saturated in addiction. The body in need 
tries to communicate vaguely and obscurely through this 
addiction what it lacks and what the addiction saturates. Need 
is incoercible because the subject is embodied and the will 
cannot just banish its presence by applying force. One cannot 
just forcefully will addiction away; what one could hope to 
achieve is not to bend the need to an almighty will, but to find 
other ways of satisfying it than addiction. The will is affected by 
the activity of the subject because, especially in habits, the will 
meets the pre-reflexive, obscure involuntary: need. The will 
before the addiction is not the same with the will after the 
addiction.  
 





In confronting the naturalistic approaches of addiction 
with a phenomenological perspective of the worldly embodied 
subject, the investigation of addiction uncovers deeper aspects 
related to both intersubjective and embodied practices that 
ultimately facilitate the addiction to take place. Addiction is not 
a problem of the will or of loss of control, but of embodied needs 
that socially sanctioned discourses keep out of view so that they 
don‟t undermine the success story of the recovering addict. The 
difficulty comes not from the fact that there is a weak will that 
cannot cope with the force of habit; the seriousness of addiction 
stems from the fact that there are unsatisfied needs, i.e. a 
powerful experience of lack and drive that, not having been 
given a chance to fulfilment, extends itself, according to the 
easiest practical option, in habits by using the capabilities of 
the subject and the available stock of possibilities of action. And 
because all these processes take place at the involuntary, pre-
reflexive level of the embodied subjects, the reflexive will has to 
deal not with addiction as habit, but with addiction as need, as 
involuntary spontaneity of the embodied subject. 
The sense of powerlessness that the subject of addiction 
experiences is, consequently, related to the work of the need 
and its lack: the impetus that triggers a bodily action cannot be 
suppressed. If the tendency can be controlled, its origin – the 
lack – cannot. One cannot ignore the body he/she lives in. The 
will can take over the tendency of need, but cannot make the 
lack disappear. The reflexive will should accept it and provide 
alternative ways of fulfilling it. And, on the other hand, the 
powers of the subject, his/her capabilities are acquired through 
the fact that the subject has a body and through repeated, 
successful actions. As any other iterative activity, as any other 
habit, addiction is a form of power: not every subject is able to 
consume alcohol on a daily basis, for example. But these 
abilities are not in themselves triggers for action: the need, 
guided by the will, is in charge. The feeling of powerlessness 
comes from the “uncanny powers” of the needy lack, to use 
Ellen West‟s expression, for which the powers of the subject 
cannot find other alleviation than addiction. To recover a sense 
of power means that the urge of the need starts to lessen its 
grip on the embodied subject. At the same time, it must be 
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stressed that this powerlessness is most acutely felt when the 
will stands in a stark opposition with the tendency of need: 
engaging in this polemical, almost static attitude, produces a 
split between an almighty, self-positing subject and a bodily 
existence deemed to be transformable at will, at the drop of a 






1 There is a perfume called “Addict”, which is a proof that the term is receiving 
also positive connotations. See Dior Addict by Christian Dior – perfume 
review, where the author notes that “they were hoping the name  –  and the 
tag line, “Admit it”  –  would get attention, and they got their wish”. (Robin 
2008) 
2 For the aspects related to recent developments in the study of medicalization, 
see Conrad (2013). 
3 She mentions, nevertheless, the topic of domination in contemporary society. 
4 A comparison between Ricoeur‟s (1949) concepts of voluntary and involuntary 
and Husserl‟s notions of activity and passivity should be interesting to be 
drawn.  
5 This idea of easiness of execution, of short-circuit of satisfaction is also 
delineated by psychoanalysis. See, for example, Rik Loose (2002).  
6 Cf. E. Husserl (1989): “Habits are necessarily formed, just as much with 
regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of the 
force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to free 
behaviour. To yield to a drive establishes the drive to yield: habitually. 
Likewise, to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist a drive 
establishes a tendency (a “drive”) to let oneself be determined once again by 
such a value-motive (and perhaps by value-motives in general) and to resist 
these drives. Here habit and free motivation intertwine.” (Husserl 1989, 267). 
7 We give here the original French formulation of Ricoeur text because the 
English translation omits the word “shock”: “If, then, habit affects need to the 
point of seeming to invent it, it does so in turn by the encounter of the 
acquired customary form and latent needs.” (Ricoeur 1966, 115).  
8 For a broader view of L. Binswanger‟s main concepts and methodology, one 




Bernet, R. 2000. “The Traumatized Subject”. Research in 
Phenomenology, vol. XXX, 160-179. 
Binswanger, L. 1963. Being-in-the-World. Selected Papers of 
Ludwig Binswanger. Translated and with a “Critical Introduction 




to His Existential Psychoanalysis” by Jacob Needlman. New 
York & London: Basic Books.  
Binswanger, L. 1958. “The Case of Ellen West: An Anthropological 
Clinical Study”. In Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and 
Psychology, edited by M. Rollo, E. Angel and H. F. Ellenberger, 
237-364. New York: Basic Books. 
Conrad, P. 2013. “Medicalization: Changing Contours, Characteristics 
and Contexts”. In Health Sociology on the Move, edited by W. 
Cockerham, 195-214. London: Oxford Blackwell. 
Dunham, L. 2016. Sorry, Not Sorry: My Apology Addiction. 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sorry-my-apology-addiction-
lena-dunham  
Flanagan, O. 2013. “Phenomenal Authority. The Epistemic 
Authority of Alcoholics Anonymous”. In Addiction and Self-
Control, edited by N. Levy, 67-93. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. [Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law, and Philosophy]. 
Householder, A. K. 2015. “Girls, Grrrls, Girls. Lena Dunham, 
Girls, and the Contradictions of Fourth Wave Feminism”. 
In Feminist Theory and Pop Culture, edited by A. Trier-
Bieniek, 19-33. Rotterdam: Sence Publishers. 
Husserl, E. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – Second Book: Studies 
in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by R. Rojcewicz 
and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Karim, R. and P. Chaudri. 2012. “Behavioral Addictions: An 
Overview”. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 5-17.  
Leneghan, S. 2011. The varieties of ecstasy experience: An 
exploration of person, mind and body in Sydney’s club culture. 
Saarbru¨cken, Germany: Lap Lambert Academic. 
Leroy, C. 2015. “Addiction et Séparation. Atelier: Addictions, 
Art et Écriture du corps”. In Implications philosophiques. 
Espace de recherche et de diffusion. http://www.implications-
philosophiques.org/actualite/une/addiction-et-separation-
christine-leroy/  [Publié le 2 février 2015]. 
Levy, N. 2013. “Addiction and Self-Control. Perspectives from 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience”. In Addiction and 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (1) / 2017 
28 
 
Self-Control, edited by N. Levy, 1-15. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. [Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law, and Philosophy]. 
Loose, R. 2002. The Subject of Addiction. Psychoanalysis and 
the Administration of Enjoyment. London & New York: Karnac.  
Marghitu, S. and C. Ng. 2013. “Body Talk: Reconsidering the 
Post-Feminist Discourse and Critical Reception of Lena 
Dunham's Girls”. Gender Forum 45. 
Ricoeur, P. 1966. Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary. Translated by E. Kohak. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
________. 1949. Philosophie de la volonté. Tome 1: Le volontaire 
et l'involontaire. Paris: Aubier. 
Robin. 2008. Dior Addict by Christian Dior – perfume review. 
Now Smell This. http://www.nstperfume.com/2008/05/20/dior-
addict-by-christian-dior-perfume-review/ [Posted by Robin on 20 
May 2008]. 
Staudigl, M. 2007. “Towards a Phenomenological Theory of 
Violence: Reflections Following Merleau-Ponty and Schutz”. 
Human Studies, 30(3): 233-253. 
Strasser, S. 1969. The idea of a dialogal phenomenology. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
Throop, C. J. 2012. “On Inaccessibility and Vulnerability: Some 
Horizons of Compatibility between Phenomenology and Psycho-
analysis”. Ethos 40: 75–96. 
Trouessin, M. 2015. Les addictions comportementales face à la 
notion de plaisir. Available at http://www.implications-
philosophiques.org/actualite/une/tout-peut-il-etre-objet daddiction/  
Weitz, R. 2015. “  to Lena Dunham‟s Girls”. Gender Issue 33(3): 
1-17. DOI:10.1007/s12147-015-9149-y. 
Woods, F. 2015. “Girls Talk: Authorship and Authenticity in the 
Reception of Lena Dunham's Girls”. Critical Studies in Tele-








Ion Copoeru teaches philosophy and ethics at Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-
Napoca. His research interests are located mainly in phenomenology 
(intersubjectivity and normativity, particularly in the work of Husserl and 
Schutz) and ethics in professions, with focus on the professions of law and 
healthcare. He is author of Aparenţă şi sens [Appearence and meaning] (2000) 
and Structuri ale constituirii [Structures of Phenomenological Constitution] 
(2001), editor or co-editor of several collective volumes, such as 
Phenomenology 2005, Vol. III (with Hans Rainer Sepp) (Zeta Books, 2007), 
Phenomenology 2010, Vol. III (with P. Kontos and A. Serrano) (Zeta Books, 
2011), Recherches phénoménologiques actuelles en Roumanie et France (with 
Alexander Schnell) (Olms, 2006).  
 
Address: 
Ion Copoeru  
Centre for Applied Philosophy, 
Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca 
1, M. Kogalniceanu street,  
400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania 
Email: copoeru@hotmail.com 
 
Nicoleta Szabo is doctoral student of the University of Amiens, where she 
prepares a thesis on the concept of intersubjectivity by Husserl. She 
translated into Romanian several books, among them being Günther Anders‟ 
The Outdatedness of Human Beings (Tact, 2015). She he is co-editor (with Ion 
Copoeru) of the volume Beyond Identity. Transformations of Identity in a 
(Post-)Modern World (Cluj-Napoca, 2004). She published, also, a series of 
articles on phenomenological topics: „L‟artiste versus l‟homme ordinaire. 
Phénoménologie de l‟histoire à partir du quotidien” (2006); „La philosophie de 




Centre for Applied Philosophy, 
Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca 
1, M. Kogalniceanu street,  
400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania 
Email: szabo_nicoleta@hotmail.com 
 
